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TOTALLY EXHAUSTED: WHY A STRICT
INTERPRETATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
UNDULY BURDENS COURTS AND PRISONERS
Adam Slutsky*
"Prison litigation may be the peaceful equivalent of a riot in
bringing prisoners' grievances to public attention and in mobilizing
political support for change."'
"In seeking to curtail frivolous lawsuits, we cannot deprive
individuals of their basic civil rights. We must find the proper
balance." 2
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, as part of its Contract with America,3 Congress responded
to the increasing burden on the federal docket by enacting the Prison
Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). 4 Section 1997e(a),5 a provision of
the PLRA, was designed to "reduce the quantity and improve the
quality of prisoner suits." '6 It provides that "[n]o action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., Cornell University,
2003. I would like to thank the litigation attorneys at the New York State Attorney
General's Office for their warmth, encouragement, and invaluable feedback during
the summer of 2004, helping to spark my interest in this topic. Thanks to Professor
Michael W. Martin for his expertise and assistance and John Boston for his insight
and advice on Part III of this Note. I would also like to thank my family, friends, and
Amy for their continuing love and support.
1. Alvin J. Bronstein, Introduction to Daniel E. Manville, Prisoners' Self-Help
Litigation Manual xxvi (John Boston ed., 1986) (quoting Professor James Jacobs).
2. 142 Cong. Rec. S5194 (1996) (statement of Sen. Simon).
3. For a statement of this policy, see U.S. House of Representatives, Republican
Contract with America, available at
http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
For a further discussion on the Contract with America, see infra notes 56-58, 83 and
accompanying text.
4. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42
U.S.C.).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
6. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002).
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title, or any other Federal law, ... by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies
as are available are exhausted."8 Each state provides inmates with
such administrative remedies, with the exhaustion requirements
generally following a similar pattern. 9 Typically, when a prisoner
brings a complaint under § 1983, he will allege multiple constitutional
violations." If all claims are unexhausted," the complaint is generally
dismissed without prejudice until the required procedures are
invoked. 2 If only one of the claims is exhausted, however, resulting in
a "mixed" complaint, the statute is virtually silent on the issue.13 This
7. Section 1983 provides a civil action for the "deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ... " 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
like the related doctrines of finality and ripeness, govern the timing of lawsuits in
federal courts. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). Exhaustion is
applicable to all inmate suits about prison life, whether the suit is about general
circumstances or particular episodes, regardless of what the alleged wrong is. See
Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. The exhaustion requirement is not absolute, however, but is
an affirmative defense that must be pled or it will be waived. See Johnson v. Testman,
380 F.3d 691 (2d Cir. 2004); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 697 (8th Cir. 2001); Perez
v. Wisc. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 1999).
9. See, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 701.7 (2001). In New York's
Inmate Grievance Program, an inmate has not fully exhausted his administrative
remedies until he first files a complaint with the prison facility's Inmate Grievance
Review Committee, then appeals to the facility superintendent, and finally appeals to
the Central Office Review Committee in Albany. Id. Once a prisoner has won all
available relief under the requisite administrative proceedings, his administrative
remedies are deemed exhausted. Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1187
(10th Cir. 2004). Prisoners do not have to appeal favorable decisions in order to
satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Id.
10. See, e.g., Ross, 365 F.3d at 1183 (bringing two Eighth Amendment claims
concerning separate alleged violations).
11. Section 1997e(a) does not specify how detailed a prisoner's grievance must be
in order to satisfy exhaustion. Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 516 (5th Cir. 2004).
Courts have generally not required the prisoner to allege a specific legal theory or
facts to correspond to that legal theory, but rather the grievance must give prison
officials fair notice of the problem that underlies the prisoner's suit. Id. (citing Burton
v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 575 (6th Cir. 2003)). Thus, the amount of detail required in
giving such notice must be interpreted in light of the purposes behind § 1997e(a). Id.
12. See Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 722 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[The PLRA's] text
does not condition access to the federal courts on satisfying the procedures and
timelines of prison administrators."); Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 892 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding that once the prisoner exhausts his administrative remedies, he can
refile the action in federal court even if the time limit had run on his grievance). But
see Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that failure to
exhaust not merely postpones, but bars a § 1983 suit); Kermit Roosevelt III,
Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The Consequence of Procedural
Error, 52 Emory L.J. 1771, 1773-74 (2003) (writing that although most federal courts
assume that a procedural error has no consequences for a subsequent § 1983 suit,
failure to exhaust may bar a suit entirely). For a further discussion on this issue, see
infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
13. A "mixed" complaint might be comprised of multiple claims against one
defendant (such as an Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claim against
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Note addresses the question of whether, in a mixed complaint, a
prisoner should be able to go forward with just the exhausted claim, or
if the entire action should be dismissed. This Note concludes, relying
primarily on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's policy
rationale, 4 that "total exhaustion" should not be required. 5
To better illustrate this procedural quagmire, consider the following
hypothetical. 6 After repeated requests, Gus Guard refuses to change
Pat Prisoner's pillows from firm to feather. Pat exhausts his
administrative remedies as to this grievance, but the outcome of the
administrative process does not afford him feather pillows. When Pat
confronts Gus again, pleading for feather pillows, Gus allegedly puts
rocks inside of the pillow and places Pat into solitary confinement for
thirty days. Infuriated, Pat brings a complaint in federal court against
Gus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding the conditions of his
confinement. He alleges an Eighth Amendment violation for cruel
and unusual punishment 7 for failing to provide him with feather
pillows. Additionally, he claims another Eighth Amendment violation
for the rocks and a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation for
the solitary confinement.'8
The question confronting courts, and the focus of this Note, is
whether under a so-called total exhaustion rule, 9 Pat's action will
have to be dismissed in its entirety despite an otherwise viable and
fully exhausted claim.2°  Courts have formulated contradictory
answers based upon conflicting interpretations of the PLRA and its
a prison guard, where only the Eighth Amendment claim is exhausted), one claim
against multiple defendants (such as Eighth Amendment claims against two prison
guards, where claims against only one guard are exhausted), or a combination of the
two.
14. See Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 658-59 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73
U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2005) (No. 04-668).
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. To turn this concise hypothetical into a cause of action, a prisoner must
convey in his suit why he is in need of redress. Jim Thomas makes an eloquent
analogy of prisoner lawsuits as narratives-"[s]imilar in some ways to dramatic Greek
tragedy, [the action must describe] the travails endured by the victim resulting from
unjust powerful external forces." Jim Thomas, Prisoner Litigation: The Paradox of
the Jailhouse Lawyer 135 (1988).
17. For an analysis of prisoners' rights under the Constitution, see generally
Penelope D. Clute, The Legal Aspects of Prisons and Jails (1980); Michael G. Collins,
Section 1983 Litigation in a Nutshell (1997); John W. Palmer, Constitutional Rights of
Prisoners (5th ed. 1997); and Chadwick L. Shook & Robert T. Sigler, Constitutional
Issues in Correctional Administration (2000).
18. See supra note 17.
19. The first court of appeals to address the "total exhaustion" issue was the
Eighth Circuit in Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 885 (8th Cir. 2000). For more on this
holding, see infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. Throughout this Note, "total
exhaustion" refers to a judicial doctrine requiring the dismissal of an entire action
despite the presence of one or more exhausted claims.
20. See Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 656 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73
U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2005) (No. 04-668).
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underlying policy.2' In Ortiz v. McBride, the Second Circuit
announced that an impermissibly brought action (containing at least
one unexhausted claim) need not be dismissed.22 In this circuit, Pat
would be able to go forward with his initial Eight Amendment claim
for cruel and unusual punishment. On the other hand, the Eighth
Circuit and Tenth Circuit have held that where any claim in the
complaint is unexhausted, § 1997e(a) requires that the action be
dismissed without prejudice. 23  Accordingly, in these circuits, Pat's
entire complaint would be dismissed.
This Note argues that the Eighth and Tenth Circuit's textual
interpretation 4 and the Tenth Circuit's habeas analogy25 needlessly
bar some meritorious prisoner suits from court, while failing to
compensate with improved judicial efficiency. The policy rationale
behind the PLRA, as laid out by the Second Circuit, 6 reveals that
there is no need for courts to dismiss exhausted claims that are ready
to be adjudicated.27
Part I of this Note begins with a general overview of the PLRA.
Part I.A discusses inmate litigation prior to the enactment of the
PLRA. Part I.B describes the legislative history leading up to the
PLRA, including the policy rationale behind the statute. Part I.C
assesses the impact that the statute has had on inmate litigation. Part
I.D introduces the total exhaustion dilemma.
Part II of this Note explores the details of the total exhaustion
dispute, viewed through the lens of the current circuit split. Part II.A
states the factual background of each case. Part II.B lays out each
circuit's textual interpretation of § 1997e(a). Part II.C outlines total
exhaustion in the habeas context, assessing how much credence each
circuit chooses to give this analogy. Part II.D then analyzes the policy
considerations of the circuits.
Part III.A claims that the Tenth Circuit interpretation of § 1997e(a)
is misapplied and excessive, thus supporting the Second Circuit's
determination that total exhaustion is not required. Part III.B
questions the assertion that prisoners' claims are frequently frivolous
and argues that the PLRA's exhaustion provision is amply stringent,
achieving its goal of curbing frivolous lawsuits without a need for total
exhaustion.
21. See infra Part II.
22. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 656-57.
23. Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004); Graves, 218
F.3d at 885.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See infra Part I.C.
26. See infra Part II.D.
27. See infra Part III.
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I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLRA
This part describes the foundation and motivation for the PLRA.
Part I.A begins by discussing the judicial policies in place prior to the
PLRA along with their quantitative impact on prisoner lawsuits. Part
I.B analyzes the legislative history and policy rationale behind the
PLRA. Part I.C describes the PLRA's impact during its short
existence. Part I.D briefly looks at the unanticipated outgrowth of §
1997e(a) -the total exhaustion doctrine.
A. Prisoner Litigation Before the PLRA
In a 1970 speech to the National Association of Attorneys
General,28 Chief Justice Burger commented on the burden of prison
litigation upon the federal judiciary:29
What we need is to supplement [judicial actions] with flexible,
sensible working mechanisms adapted to the modem conditions of
overcrowded and understaffed prisons ... a simple and workable
procedure by which every person in confinement who has, or thinks
he has, a grievance or complaint can be heard promptly, fairly and
fully.
30
In the years that followed, state correctional departments initiated
inmate grievance procedures in order to bear some of the burden.1
Despite such a system, the Supreme Court held that courts were not
free to require exhaustion of administrative remedies, particularly in
cases involving civil rights deprivations.32 Consequently, if the claim
28. The National Association of Attorneys General eventually helped spur the
enactment of the PLRA. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
29. Shortly before 1970, prisoners had little reason to bring their actions for
constitutional deprivations in federal court because most courts refused to adjudicate
such claims. See Lynn S. Branham, Am. Bar Ass'n Criminal Justice Section, Limiting
the Burdens of Pro Se Inmate Litigation: A Technical-Assistance Manual for Courts,
Correctional Officers, and Attorneys General 20 (1997). Federal courts favored this
"hands-off" doctrine because they believed the operation of prisons to be the
responsibility of the executive and legislative branches. Id. Thus, the advantage of
such a policy was to leave prison-related decision making to those most
knowledgeable about the correctional system. The Fed. Judicial Ctr., Recommended
Procedures for Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in Federal Courts 29 (1980)
[hereinafter Recommended Procedures]. The disadvantage was to place contentious
constitutional issues in the hands of administrative rather than judicial bodies. Id.
30. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Speech to the National Association of
Attorneys General in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 1970), in Recommended Procedures,
supra note 29, at 24. For an in-depth analysis of the Burger Court and prisoners'
rights, see John A. Fliter, Prisoners' Rights: The Supreme Court and Evolving
Standards of Decency 93-137 (2001).
31. See Recommended Procedures, supra note 29, at 24-28; see, e.g., Comp. Codes
R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 701 (2001).
32. Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432 (1975). In Ellis, the Court followed its ruling
in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), and held that "the opportunity for
adjudication of constitutional rights in a federal forum, as authorized by the
Declaratory Judgment Act, becomes paramount." Ellis, 421 U.S. at 432 (citation
20051 2293
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was made under § 1983, a state inmate had an "open door" to federal
courts.3 3
With several key decisions opening the door in the preceding two
decades,34 along with the passage of the PLRA's predecessor, the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 5 the year 1980 is
a suitable point to begin quantifying the effects of prisoner civil rights
litigation36 on the federal court system.37 The number of state prisoner
civil rights lawsuits filed in federal court increased from 12,397 in 1980
to 40,569 in 1995 38-a 227% increase.39 While it logically seems as if
omitted). In 1992, the Supreme Court found that a federal prisoner was not required
to exhaust his administrative remedies because Congress had not "meaningfully
addressed the appropriateness of requiring exhaustion" for federal prisoners and the
individual plaintiff's interests outweighed the countervailing institutional interests.
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149 (1992).
33. See Recommended Procedures, supra note 29, at 30.
34. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (finding a prisoner's right to be free
from prison conditions rising to the level of cruel and unusual punishment); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (finding a prisoner's right to due process during
certain prison disciplinary proceedings); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)
(finding a prisoner to have rights under the First Amendment); Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396 (1974) (finding a prisoner's right to have access to the courts); Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (finding a prisoner's right to equal
protection of the law).
35. Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA")
was a response to reports of constitutional rights violations in prisons, jails, mental
health facilities, and various other confinement institutions. Lynn S. Branham, The
Prison Litigation Reform Act's Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement: What It Means
and What Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials Can Learn from It, 86 Cornell
L. Rev. 483, 493 (2001). For an overview of the legal rights of the mentally
disordered, see generally Fred Cohen, The Mentally Disordered Inmate and the Law
(1998). CRIPA's exhaustion provision was originally limited in scope, where not
every § 1983 suit required administrative exhaustion. See Branham, supra, at 495; Fed.
Judicial Ctr., Resource Guide for Managing Prisoner Civil Rights Litigation with
Special Emphasis on the Prison Litigation Reform Act 34-35 (1996). For example, a
court could only require exhaustion if it found it to be "appropriate and in the
interests of justice." § 7, 94 Stat. at 349 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000)).
Additionally, under CRIPA, courts stayed cases that had not yet been exhausted. See
Branham, supra, at 497. The PLRA modified CRIPA and § 1983 by requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies before a prisoner can file suit in federal court
challenging the conditions of his confinement. See Paul Wright, Prison Litigation
Reform Act Passed, Prison Legal News, July 1996, at 3.
36. The vast majority of prisoner § 1983 lawsuits are filed by state prisoners
proceeding pro se. See Lynn S. Branham & Sheldon Krantz, Sentencing, Corrections,
and Prisoners' Rights in a Nutshell 288 (4th ed. 1994); see, e.g., Ross v. County of
Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1182 (10th Cir. 2004). Seven out of ten prisoners perform at
the lowest literacy levels. Karl 0. Haigler et al., Literacy Behind Prison Walls 17-19
(1994), available at http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubs94/94102.pdf. Thus, prisoner suits are
considered burdensome because many prisoners lack the basic literacy skills typically
present in litigants. See Branham, supra note 29, at 36; cf Manville, supra note 1, at 1-
10 (discussing the importance of prisoner self-education and preparation before filing
a lawsuit).
37. See Branham, supra note 29, at 20.
38. See id. at 21 (citing Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the
Director of the United States Courts-1980, at 232 (1980)); id. (citing Admin. Office
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the open door led to an astronomical increase in prisoner litigation, in
the same time-span, the number of state prisoners increased by
237%.4" Accordingly, the per capita rate of prisoner suits in federal
court actually fell from 40.7 suits per thousand state prisoners in 1980
to 39.4 suits per thousand state prisoners in 1995.41 Therefore, the
increase in prisoner litigation was more likely the result of an
"epidemic of incarceration, ' '42 and increased litigation was merely a
byproduct of that epidemic.43
Nevertheless, critics of the federal court system chose to focus on
increased prisoner litigation44 rather than the soaring prison
population, and, in particular, the frivolity of these lawsuits.45
Spearheading the campaign to amend the system was the alliance of
the National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG") and the
National District Attorneys Association ("NDAA").46 Of great
of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 1995 Report of the
Director 145 (1995)).
39. For a state-by-state breakdown of prisoner lawsuits, see Branham, supra note
29, at 24-25. For a comparison of prison filings in federal court with civilian filings
from 1960 through 1986, see Thomas, supra note 16, at 56 (citing Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director of the United States Courts-1986, at tbl.
3c (1986)).
40. See Branham, supra note 29, at 21-22; John Scalia, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Prisoner Petitions in the Federal Courts 1980-96, at 5 (1997), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppfc96.pdf.
41. See Branham, supra note 29, at 21.
42. Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1777. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116
Harv. L. Rev. 1555, 1586-87 (2003) ("[I]t would be equally appropriate to talk about a
'deluge' of inmate requests for food."). But see Note, The Indeterminacy of Inmate
Litigation: A Response to Professor Schlanger, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1661, 1668 (2004)
("Whereas Professor Schlanger set aside the increases of the 1970s as antediluvian
irrelevancies, the PLRA's proponents viewed those increases as the onset of a
continuing deluge-the first wave, so to speak.").
43. Additionally, courts cited lack of funds and judicial vacancies as exacerbating
the litigation burden. See Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual
Judges' Practices: An Inadvertent Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
68 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1994) (asserting that, despite correctable factors such as
judicial vacancies, "the perceived 'litigation explosion' has energized a movement
advocating increased judicial management -sometimes by restricting access to the
federal courts in order to lessen the burden").
44. See Damn Lies and Statistics, Prison Legal News, Apr. 1996, at 13. The
National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG") provided a press release
showing a twenty-two percent increase in § 1983 lawsuits between 1986 and 1992.
What the NAAG failed to mention, however, was that concurrently, the number of
prisoners had increased by sixty-two percent. Id.; see also supra text accompanying
notes 38-41.
45. See Wright, supra note 35, at 1; see also Schlanger, supra note 42, at 1567
(stating that the driving belief behind the PLRA was that inmate litigation often
turned trivial mishaps into federal litigation).
46. See Schlanger, supra note 42, at 1566; Wright, supra note 35, at I ("The PLRA
is the culmination of a lengthy campaign waged by prisoncrats and the [NAAG] to
restrict prisoners' right of access to federal courts and to limit the ability of courts to
remedy constitutional violations when they are found.").
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notoriety were the "top ten" frivolous lawsuit lists, 47 distributed
throughout the media by the NAAG and certain state attorneys
general.48 The paradigmatic frivolous suit from these lists was
initiated by a prisoner upset with his prison's substitution of a jar of
creamy peanut butter for a jar of chunky peanut butter.49 Despite
evidence suggesting that the triviality of many prisoner suits was
exaggerated, 0 the lists, as intended, spurred a copious amount of
47. Issued by then-Attorney General of Colorado, Gale Norton, the following is
an example of a state "top ten" list of inmate frivolous lawsuits:
10 - He failed to receive post-operative medical care because he refused to
go to an infirmary without a television set....
9 - He was taken off an ulcer diet that he didn't comply with....
8 - Serial numbers on new television sets did not always match the serial
numbers on the boxes in which they were delivered....
7 - He received inferior medical care after undergoing two arthroscopic
surgeries on his knee. A judge described the inmate's pharmaceutical and
physical therapy as care that "would be envied by the majority of (adults)
not incarcerated .. "
6 - He should be released because "everyone knows an inmate only serves
about three years of a 10-year sentence ......
5 - He was not allowed to play cards after 10 p.m....
4 - The parole board failed to consider his parole on the prearranged date-
a date upon which the inmate was absent because he had escaped....
3 - He didn't get a recording contract because gaurds [sic] confiscated a
cassette tape that advocated racial violence against police....
2 - Prison officials shouldn't have intercepted pictures of nude children sent
in the mail. The inmate was a convicted pedophile....
And the No. 1 frivolous lawsuit: It was filed by a high school dropout
claiming that the confiscation of four folders of pornography hindered his
"obtaining a doctorate in obstetrics-gynecology...."
Kris Newcomer, Norton's Top 10 Lawsuits: Attorney General Compiles a List of
Wildest Inmate Claims, Rocky Mountain News, Aug. 3, 1995, at 4A, available at
LEXIS, News Library, RMTNEW File. Two lists like this eventually became part of
the PLRA's congressional record. See Schlanger, supra note 42, at 1568. Contra
Anthony Lewis, Cruel and Unusual, Bait. Evening Sun, Feb. 20, 1995, at 11A
(providing even more examples of non-frivolous suits which would be hampered by
the PLRA); ACLU National Prison Project, The Top Ten Non-Frivolous Lawsuits
Filed by Prisoners (Feb. 11, 1996) (responding to the various "top ten" frivolous
lawsuit lists, which were "touted by various attorney generals [sic], during a time
when state and federal lawmakers were enacting restrictions on prisoner rights"), at
http://www.prisonwall.org/ten.htm.
48. See Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1776-77 (claiming that the perception of
rampant frivolous lawsuits was cued not by any actual data indicating a problem, but
by an aggressive media campaign started by congressional republicans and individual
state attorneys general).
49. Dennis C. Vacco, Frankie Sue del Papa, Pamela Fanning Carter & Christine
0. Gregoire, Letter to the Editor, Free the Courts from Frivolous Prisoner Suits, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 3, 1995, at A26. This letter was from the Attorneys General of New
York, Nevada, Indiana, and Washington, respectively. Id.
50. See Jon 0. Newman, Not All Prisoner Lawsuits Are Frivolous, The
Corrections Prof'l., Jan. 1996, reprinted in Prison Legal News, Apr. 1996, at 6.
Newman, then-Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, wrote this article in response to the joint letter sent to the New York
Times, supra note 49. In describing his experience as a federal judge, he wrote,
"though I have seen many prisoner suits that lacked merit, it has not been my
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media commentary.5 Like the infamous spilled McDonald's coffee
case,5 2 cases from the "top ten" lists came to symbolize inherent flaws
in the United States legal system.53 With the onslaught of media
scrutiny, Congress was practically forced to address the perceived
problems,54 and the PLRA followed on April 26, 1996.51
B. The Politics and Policy Behind the PLRA
The NAAG and NDAA found their savior to help curb frivolous
lawsuits in the Republican Congress's 1994 Contract with America. 6
House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich, epitomizing
Republican sentiment, wrote that "America has become a litigious
experience in 23 years as a federal Judge that what the attorneys general described
was at all 'typical' of prisoner litigation." Newman, supra, at 6. Newman goes on to
discuss the peanut butter case, where it turned out that the prisoner sued not because
he received creamy peanut butter instead of chunky, but instead because when he
returned the creamy peanut butter and was promised to be sent the chunky peanut
butter the next day, his commissary account remained charged $2.50 for a can he
never ended up receiving. Id.
51. See, e.g., Walter Berns, Sue the Warden, Sue the Chef, Sue the Gardener...,
Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 1995, at A12.
52. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. 93-02419, 1995 WL 360309,
at *1 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994).
53. See Michael McCann et al., Java Jive: Genealogy of a Juridical Icon, 56 U.
Miami L. Rev. 113 (2001) (providing a detailed account of the McDonald's coffee
case and its cultural ramifications).
54. The manner in which Congress went about enacting the PLRA received much
academic scrutiny. For example, Professor Susan N. Herman wrote:
The legislative process leading to the passage of the PLRA was
characterized by haste and lack of any real debate. The Act was passed as a
rider to the Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, without a Judiciary
Committee Report and without committee mark-up. Its provisions, which
amend a number of different sections of the United States Code, bear many
signs of the haste with which they were passed. Key terms were not defined,
some provisions conflicted with preexisting law, and even the title could
have used editing: entitled the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, it was
actually passed in 1996.
Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights: Congress and the Supreme
Court in Dialogue, 77 Or. L. Rev. 1229, 1277 (1998) (internal citation omitted); see
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 654 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The
PLRA is not a paragon of clarity."). For more information pertaining to the PLRA's
legislative history, see infra Part I.B.
55. In the opinion of Mark Tushnet and Larry Yackle, the PLRA represented a
conservative victory in "the battle of sound bites" by focusing on lawsuits about
peanut butter rather than the many non-frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners. Mark
Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
47 Duke L.J. 1, 64 (1997).
56. See U.S. House of Representatives, supra note 3. The Contract with America
defined frivolity as including cases that "would not stand on [their] own merits" but
would cause defendants to settle "just to avoid the endless and expensive claim and
appeal processes." Note, supra note 42, at 1665 (quoting Contract with America: The
Bold Plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans to
Change the Nation 145 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (internal quotations
omitted)) [hereinafter Contract with America].
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society: [w]e sue each other too often and too easily."57 While the
Republicans were concerned with litigation in general,58 the prisoner
population was a particularly easy group to regulate. 9 As Professor
Margo Schlanger writes, "[i]n the first heady days of Republican
control of both chambers of Congress, prisoners made awfully
attractive targets-and Republican leaders vying for support from the
party faithful were happy to outbid one another in anti-criminal
toughness."6 After more than a dozen attempts to pass legislation in
a freestanding bill,61 the PLRA62 was signed into law by President
Clinton, attached as a rider to the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions
and Appropriations Act of 1996.63
The PLRA seeks to deter frivolous suits by improving judicial
efficiency.' Administrative exhaustion is a prime example of a
provision that attempts to accomplish this goal.65 In McCarthy v.
57. Note, supra note 42, at 1662 (quoting Contract with America, supra note 56, at
144 (internal quotations omitted)). But see Christopher E. Smith, Courts, Politics, and
the Judicial Process 330 (2d ed. 1997) (citing two studies: one showing that litigation
rates peaked in the mid-nineteenth century and subsequent litigation rates paralleled
population growth and economic change; and the second indicating that, in a cross-
national comparison, the United States is not uniquely litigious).
58. Note, supra note 42, at 1662 (stating that Republicans believed that even
meritorious lawsuits would be resolved more efficiently though mechanisms besides
the federal courts).
59. See 141 Cong. Rec. S14571 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("The time and
money spent defending most [inmate] cases are clearly time and money that could be
better spent prosecuting criminals, fighting illegal drugs, or cracking down on
consumer fraud."); Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1779 ("The media, which so relished
describing the inventive miscreants who brought the most outrageous suits, has shown
a similar enthusiasm for recounting their comeuppance.").
60. Schlanger, supra note 42, at 1567.
61. For a detailed list of these attempts, see id. at 1559 n.9.
62. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
63. Id. In expressing his concerns about the PLRA, Senator Kennedy said that
enacting the proposal within an appropriations bill would be unsuitable, and that the
"abbreviated nature of the legislative process" should not be interpreted as a sign of
general complacency by Congress with the PLRA. 142 Cong. Rec. S5194 (1996)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy); Herman, supra note 54, at 1277; Letter from Fred
Thompson, Jim Jeffords, Ted Kennedy, Joe Biden & Jeff Bingaman, U.S. Senators, to
Janet Reno, Attorney General of the U.S., Department of Justice (Feb. 2, 1996),
reprinted in 142 Cong. Rec. S5194 (printed in the record following remarks by Sen.
Kennedy, referring to the lack of thorough congressional review given to the PLRA).
64. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002); Branham, supra note 35, at
487-89 (stating that the touted objective of the PLRA is to curb frivolous lawsuits by
prisoners). Another aspect of the PLRA evidencing this fact besides exhaustion is the
filing free provision. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2000). All prisoners now had to pay the
full filing fee, thereby rendering it more difficult to gain access to federal courts. See
Branham, supra note 29, at 141. For a summary of more key PLRA provisions, see
Branham, supra note 35, at 489-93; Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1778-79; and
Schlanger, supra note 42, at 1627-33.
65. According to Branham, the PLRA narrowed CRIPA's administrative
exhaustion provision in four ways: (I) the PLRA mandates dismissal, rather than the
staying of a case where administrative remedies are not yet exhausted; (2) all
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Madigan, the Supreme Court explicitly laid out the twin purposes of
administrative exhaustion: to protect administrative agency authority
and promote judicial efficiency.66 As to the former, agencies should
have a preliminary opportunity to resolve a controversy confronting
it, for they, and not the courts, are delegated power by Congress to do
SO.67 The latter goal can be accomplished when the administrative
agency corrects the error, thereby obviating the need for judicial
review.68 Even if this does not occur, exhaustion will, at the very least,
develop a coherent factual record to aid courts6 9 and filter out some
frivolous claims.70
Combining these background principles of judicial efficiency with
the extensive media onslaught for reform,7' Republicans were able to
enact the PLRA.7" The legislative history, however, is quite sparse,
especially that which relates to the exhaustion requirement.73 This
part focuses on two exemplary precursors to the PLRA (one initiated
prisoners, including federal prisoners and incarcerated juveniles, are subject to the
PLRA's exhaustion requirement; (3) the PLRA eliminated the cap on the exhaustion
period, whereas under CRIPA, the prisoner only had to exhaust remedies available
within 180 days; if no grievance procedure was provided, the prisoner could then
proceed to court; and (4) the PLRA removed statutory language mandating that the
court find that exhaustion would be "appropriate and in the interests of justice" and
that the remedies be "plain, speedy, and effective"; all that remained in the PLRA
was merely the requirement that remedies be "available." Branham, supra note 35, at
497-98 (internal quotations omitted). See Sharon I. Fiedler, Comment, Past Wrongs,
Present Futility, and the Future of Prisoner Relief A Reasonable Interpretation of
"Available" in the Context of the PLRA, 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 713, 724 (2000) (noting
that the PLRA extended the exhaustion requirement beyond § 1983 litigation, most
notably to prisoners bringing Bivens actions).
66. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992). Though this analysis
pertained to CRIPA's exhaustion requirement, these central tenets of exhaustion
became the basis for the PLRA's stricter policy. For an account of CRIPA's
legislative history for exhaustion, see Branham, supra note 35, at 501-03.
67. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145.
68. Id. But see Branham, supra note 35, at 514-15. "The problem with this
argument is that it would support the application of exhaustion requirements in cases
in which the Supreme Court has refused to require a plaintiff to exhaust
administrative or judicial remedies." Id. at 514 (citing Clayton v. Int'l Union, 451 U.S.
679, 689 (1981)).
69. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145-46. But see Branham, supra note 35, at 514-15
(questioning whether the administrative hearings would actually yield a complete
factual record for the courts). For example, in a survey of state departments of
correction, more than half of the departments surveyed claimed that when a prisoner
seeks relief for which the grievance procedure cannot provide redress, no factual
record is produced for the courts to rely on. Id. at 515.
70. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002).
71. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. For an extensive compilation of
the legislative history surrounding the PLRA, see Branham, supra note 35, at 487-88
n.12.
73. See Branham, supra note 35, at 503.
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by the Senate and the other by the House of Representatives) that
confirm this fact.74
The PLRA's proponents in the Senate merely gave recitations of
the jargon of the NAAG, NDAA, and the media, 5 giving virtually no
clues as to how an updated exhaustion provision would be
interpreted.76 For instance, while introducing an unsuccessful version
of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Senator Bob Dole said
that "[p]risoners have filed lawsuits claiming such grievances as
insufficient storage locker space, being prohibited from attending a
wedding anniversary party, and yes, being served creamy peanut
butter instead of the chunky variety they had ordered. 7 7 Senator Jon
Kyl only added that exhaustion of administrative remedies was
needed because of the easy accessibility to these remedies and the
burden placed on federal courts from non-meritorious claims.78
The House of Representatives provided a bit more substance on the
PLRA's impact on the exhaustion requirement. Representative
Frank LoBiondo from New Jersey, referencing McCarthy, said that
"[t]he real problem.., came with the Court's decision in 1992 that an
inmate need not exhaust the administrative remedies available prior
to proceeding . . ."I' As a response, LoBiondo introduced the
74. Prisoner Lawsuit Efficiency Act of 1995, H.R. 2468, 104th Cong. (1995);
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, S. 866, 104th Cong. (1995).
75. In his introduction to an initial attempt at the bill, Senator Dole made
appealing statements, such as, "[w]hen average law-abiding citizens file a lawsuit, they
recognize that there could be an economic downside to going to court. Convicted
criminals shouldn't get preferential treatment .. " 141 Cong. Rec. S14571 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Dole) (describing the filing fee provision as described supra note
64). Senator Kyl added that the bill would deter frivolous lawsuits, citing statistics to
support the proposition "that pro se civil rights litigation has become a recreational
activity for state prisoners .... " Id. at S14572 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (quoting Gabel
v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 124, 125 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). Both Dole and Kyl
referred to Walter Berns's Wall Street Journal article entitled Sue the Warden, Sue the
Chef, Sue the Gardener .... See supra Berns, note 51. The entire article, along with
an article from the Tucson Citizen, is even reprinted in the Congressional Record. 141
Cong. Rec. S14573-74 (1995) (generally discussing the troubles of inmate litigation).
But see Note, supra note 42, at 1666 (arguing that the use of media commentary such
as the "top ten" cases was meant to demonstrate the necessity of the PLRA, but
PLRA advocates also worried about the commonly subtle examples of inmate
litigation that failed to meet requisite legal standards).
76. See Branham, supra note 35, at 506-07.
77. 141 Cong. Rec. S14570.
78. Id. at S14572-73. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Associate U.S. Attorney General John Schmidt stated that the PLRA "strengthens
the administrative exhaustion rule ... and brings [it] more into line with
administrative exhaustion rules that apply in other contexts-by generally prohibiting
prisoner § 1983 suits until administrative remedies are exhausted." Prison Reform:
Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration: Hearing on S. 3, S. 38, S. 400, S. 866, S.
930, H.R. 667 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 20-21 (1995)
(testimony and statement of John Schmidt, Associate Attorney General, United
States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.).
79. 141 Cong. Rec. H35623 (1995) (remarks of Rep. LoBiondo). When
interpreting the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, the Supreme Court held that
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Prisoner Lawsuit Efficiency Act ("PLEA"), which would have
required all federal inmates asserting a claim pertaining to the
conditions of their confinement to exhaust their administrative
remedies.8" By increasing the cost to prisoners in both time and
money, PLEA would help deter frivolous lawsuits and create a record
to aid the federal courts.8t
Though ultimately unsuccessful, the Dole-Kyl Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 and PLEA (among a myriad of other failed
legislation)8 2 show two basic points about Congress's intent. First, as
part of their promise in the Contract with America,83 the Republicans
the fair inference to be drawn is that Congress meant to preclude the
McCarthy result. Congress's imposition of an obviously broader exhaustion
requirement makes it highly implausible that it meant to give prisoners a
strong inducement to skip the administrative process simply by limiting
prayers for relief to money damages not offered through administrative
grievance mechanisms.
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,740-41 (2001).
80. This proposal provided:
No action shall be brought in any court, by a prisoner in the custody of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, concerning any aspect of such prisoner's
incarceration until any administrative remedy procedures available are
exhausted. This section applies to all actions regardless of the nominal party
defendant. The fact that the administrative remedies do not include all the
possible procedures and forms of recovery that are available in the civil
action does not render such administrative remedies inadequate or excuse
the failure to exhaust them.
Prisoner Lawsuit Efficiency Act of 1995, H.R. 2468, 104th Cong. (1995). For an
insightful analysis of the exhaustion requirement when the administrative remedy
sought cannot be obtained through the grievance procedure, see generally Branham,
supra note 35.
81. 141 Cong. Rec. H35624 (remarks of Rep. LoBiondo quoting former Attorney
General Dick Thornburgh). LoBiondo's desire to create a factual record for the
courts is consistent with an aim expressed in McCarthy, but unlike the Supreme Court
held in that case, LoBiondo was not willing to ever bypass the exhaustion
requirement. See id.
82. See Schlanger, supra note 42, at 1559 n.9.
83. Their promise was
not just to change.., policies, but even more important, to restore the bonds
of trust between the people and their elected representatives. That is why,
in this era of official evasion and posturing, we offer instead a detailed
agenda for national renewal, a written commitment with no fine print. This
year's election offers the chance, after four decades of one-party control, to
bring to the House a new majority that will transform the way Congress
works. That historic change would be the end of government that is too big,
too intrusive, and too easy with the public's money. It can be the beginning
of a Congress that respects the values and shares the faith of the American
family. Like Lincoln, our first Republican president, we intend to act "with
firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right." To restore
accountability to Congress. To end its cycle of scandal and disgrace. To
make us all proud again of the way free people govern themselves. On the
first day of the 104th Congress, the new Republican majority will
immediately pass.., major reforms, aimed at restoring the faith and trust of
the American people in their government ....
U.S. House of Representatives, supra note 3.
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were committed to curing "a sudden epidemic of frivolous lawsuits."84
Second, they wanted to fix the problem as expeditiously as possible.
However, commentators have indicated, and cases have
demonstrated, that Congress's haste led to a plethora of problems
concerning the applicability of the exhaustion provision of the
PLRA.8 5
C. Prisoner Litigation After the PLRA
The PLRA has curbed the volume of inmate litigation
substantially,86 particularly due to the exhaustion requirement. 7
Between 1995 (a year before the Act was passed) and 2000, for
example, the number of civil rights petitions was reduced by thirty-
nine percent, from 41,679 to 25,504.8 Similarly, the filing rate (the
number of petitions filed per one thousand inmates) decreased from
thirty-seven to nineteen. As such, "to the extent that success can be
measured by the volume of suits, the PLRA has worked .... [The]
substantial decrease ... is all the more impressive when considered in
light of the growing prison population."9  The numbers, however,
never do tell the whole story. 1
Exhaustion is not unique to the PLRA, and is a doctrine with which
federal courts are quite familiar' in the context of administrative law93
84. Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1776.
85. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002) (determining what the term
"prison conditions" meant under § 1997e(a)). See generally Branham, supra note 35
(contemplating whether the exhaustion requirement should apply when a prisoner
seeks redress unavailable through the internal grievance procedure); Roosevelt, supra
note 12 (discussing the scope of the exhaustion requirement and Congress's silence on
the consequences of procedural missteps in the course of exhaustion). See also infra
note 99. Compare Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting the total
exhaustion doctrine), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2005) (No. 04-668),
with Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2004) (advocating the total
exhaustion doctrine), and Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2000) (same).
86. See John Scalia, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prisoner Petitions Filed in the U.S.
District Courts, 2000, with Trends 1980-2000, at 1 (2002), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppfusdOO.pdf.
87. See Schlanger, supra note 42, at 1627-28.
88. Scalia, supra note 86, at 1. For a more detailed quantitative analysis,
comparing both federal and state prisoners along with civil rights positions and other
petitions (such as habeas corpus), see id. at 2-3.
89. Id. at 1.
90. Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1779.
91. See infra notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., supra note 8.
93. Here, a party subject to an enforcement proceeding by an agency may not
bring an action in federal court before fully challenging the agency at the
administrative level. See Ronald A. Cass et al., Administrative Law: Cases and
Materials 402-03 (3rd ed. 1998). The seminal case on administrative exhaustion is
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., where the Court found it to be a "long settled
rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed
or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted."
303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). Though firmly stated in Myers, administrative exhaustion is
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and under the federal habeas statute.94 Professor Schlanger points out
that, whereas in administrative law the Supreme Court carved out
certain exceptions to exhaustion,95 it has invoked no such exceptions
in dealing with the PLRA.96 Instead, some courts are implementing
the PLRA using the "extraordinarily harsh"9 habeas "procedural
default,"9 affording themselves no discretion to excuse certain
inconsequential procedural errors.99 The only caveat is that the
remedies be "available," 100 which the Supreme Court has loosely
interpreted to mean "regardless of the relief offered through
administrative procedures."' '°1
This harsh standard arguably makes the modified exhaustion
requirement the greatest hurdle for prisoners to overcome. 102
a bit more malleable, and will not be required if notions of "individual justice,
efficiency, or wise judicial administration support the need for judicial review in the
absence of exhaustion." 2 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 15.2,
at 967-68 (4th ed. 2002).
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). A petition for habeas corpus enables a prisoner
to challenge a criminal conviction, an administrative procedure, a prison regulation,
or a condition of confinement. See Thomas, supra note 16, at 75 (citing Hillel
Hoffman, Prisoners' Rights: Treatment of Prisoners and Post-Conviction Remedies,
Cases and Material 15 (1981 Supp.)). For a historical analysis of federal habeas
corpus, see James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure (2d ed. 1994); and Thomas, supra note 16, at 74-128. The habeas corpus
exhaustion doctrine will be discussed in relation to the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement infra Part II.C.
95. The four possible exceptions explicated by the Supreme Court stem from the
extent of the injury by requiring administrative exhaustion, the degree of difficulty of
the issue to be resolved, the extent to which specialized administrative fact finding
and expertise will aid the court, and the extent to which the agency has already done
its fact finding or applied its expertise. Schlanger, supra note 42, at 1652 (citing 2
Pierce, Jr., supra note 93, at 976-77). Further, the Supreme Court has said that the
exhaustion doctrine in administrative law is "intensely practical." Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976) (internal quotations omitted).
96. Schlanger, supra note 42, at 1652.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 1651 n.319 ("[Pirisoners waive their right to federal review by any
failure to comply with state court procedural requirements.").
99. Compare Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004)
(finding that, like § 2254, the PLRA's exhaustion requirement includes a procedural
default component), and Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)
(same), with Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 722-23 (6th Cir. 2003) (providing a
more forgiving interpretation of the exhaustion requirement "in light of Congress's
purpose in passing the PLRA and Supreme Court precedent regarding the exhaustion
doctrine's oft-stated purpose: to give prison officials the first opportunity to address
inmate complaints according to their rules and procedures without letting those
timetables dictate the outcomes of § 1983 actions").
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
101. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).
102. See Schlanger, supra note 42, at 1628 ("The exhaustion requirement has teeth
because many courts have held that an inmate's failure to comply with the grievance
system's rules (time limits, form, and so on) usually justifies disqualification of the
inmate's lawsuit."). Schlanger goes on to add that "seven years of experience with the
statute have led [prisoners'] advocates to identify the PLRA's exhaustion rule as the
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Schlanger writes that compelling federal courts to dismiss when a
prisoner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies has a twofold
effect. First, some inmates will be remedied through the grievance
process, which would plainly decrease the number of suits reaching
federal court. 113 Consequently, this will decrease the success rate of
those claims that do make it to federal court, with the meritorious
filtered out by the administrative grievance process." Second, and
far more significantly, prisoners will be precluded from federal court
because exhaustion "is a highly technical growth area-and one in
which most courts seem to be finding ways for inmates to lose.' 10 5
Moreover, the decreased number of prisoner-filed lawsuits 6 can be
attributed to strict court requirements, causing suits that would have
been meritorious before the PLRA to be dismissed for failure to
exhaust. 107
D. The "Total Exhaustion" Doctrine
One such strict court requirement was introduced by the Eighth
Circuit in 200018 (and later corroborated by the Tenth Circuit). 19 The
Eighth Circuit, in a cursory decision, held that "§ 1997e(a) requires
that all available prison grievance remedies must be exhausted as to
all of the claims."''0 Because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust some of
their many claims within the action, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the action without prejudice.'
Considering the silence of the PLRA's legislative history regarding
exhaustion 12 and the procedural complications arising out of
administrative exhaustion, 3 it is not surprising that § 1997e(a) has
statute's most damaging component." Id. at 1650; see, e.g., Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1024
(demonstrating the high bar that prisoners may face).
103. Schlanger, supra note 42, at 1653 (labeling this kind of outcome as a "conflict-
resolution effect").
104. Id.
105. Id. (labeling this kind of outcome as a "decision-standard effect").
106. See supra notes 86, 88, 89 and accompanying text.
107. See Schlanger, supra note 42, at 1654 ("I would expect, then, that many cases
that would have succeeded in federal court prior to the PLRA will now lose because
of failures to exhaust."). But see Note, supra note 42, at 1675-76 (agreeing with
Professor Schlanger that certain meritorious suits would be disqualified, but claiming
that this would streamline the federal inmate docket-"the PLRA's proponents
would view administrative proceedings as reliable and as a significantly more efficient
means of resolving inmate disputes than the federal courts would be; it is this basic
difference in political opinions that explains the difference in theoretical
predictions").
108. Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2000).
109. Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1188 (10th Cir. 2004).
110. Graves, 218 F.3d at 885.
111. Id. at 885-86.
112. See Branham, supra note 35, at 503 ("[Mjost of the PLRA-related legislative
materials that do exist bear on provisions other than the exhaustion requirement.").
113. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
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produced controversy. Part II addresses the total exhaustion circuit
split between the Second and Tenth Circuits.
II. DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF § 1997e(a)
Part I described an intensive media campaign, a Congress eager to
initiate reform, and a federal judiciary more than willing to defer to
prison grievance systems. All of this led to the acceptance and
ingratiation of the PLRA into prisoner litigation. However, the
characteristics that gave life to the PLRA are also responsible for the
gaps in the legislation. 14 Section 1997e(a) states that "[n]o action
shall be brought. . . until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted."' 15 Based on the text of the provision, did Congress
intend for mixed actions to be entirely barred from federal court?
This part presents the total exhaustion circuit split between the
Second and Tenth Circuits." 6 Part II.A states the facts surrounding
the prisoner-plaintiffs in each case. Part II.B explores possible textual
interpretations of § 1997e(a). Part II.C compares total exhaustion
under the PLRA with total exhaustion in the habeas context,
presenting each circuit's determination of the applicability of such a
comparison. Part II.D concludes with the policy considerations
behind the courts' decisions.
A. The § 1983 Claims of Michael Rene Ross and Jose Ortiz
1. Ross v. County of Bernalillol1 7
On November 29, 1999, Michael Rene Ross fell in the shower at the
McKinley County Detention Center"'8 in New Mexico.' 9 Citing a lack
of slip-resistant mats on the shower floor as the cause, he asserted that
his shoulder was seriously injured in the fall." On December 1, 1999,
114. Besides total exhaustion, see, for example, Branham, supra note 35, at 498
(analyzing congressional intent for the phrase "as are available" in § 1997e(a)).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
116. The total exhaustion issue is also pending before the Ninth Circuit. The
district court case is Lira v. Director of Corrections of California, No. 00-905, 2002 WL
1034043 at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2002).
117. 365 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2004).
118. Id. at 1182. Until January 2000, the McKinley County Detention Center was
operated by Correctional Services Corporation, a private entity and defendant in the
action. Id. at 1183. Management & Training Corporation, another private company,
took over and was also named as a defendant. Id. See generally Mgmt. & Training
Corp., About Corrections, at http://www.mtctrains.com/corrections/index.php (last
visited Feb. 19, 2005). Between February 4 and February 25, 2000 Ross was
temporarily held at the Bernalillo County Detention Center. Ross, 365 F.3d at 1183.
119. Ross, 365 F.3d at 1183 n.3.
120. Id. at 1182. There were mats in the shower at one point, but they were
destroyed a few weeks earlier by other prisoners. Id.
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Ross submitted an Inmate Grievance Form,' complaining about the
lack of medical treatment he was receiving for his injury. 122 After this
date, he did not again invoke the prison's grievance process for lack of
adequate medical care.123
On December 6, 1999, Ross filed a Pre-Grievance Resolution Form,
reporting his fall and requesting mats to be placed in the shower
area.124  Two days later, the grievance officer notified Ross that a
shower mat was placed in the shower. 125
Based on his injury and the alleged lack of medical care, Ross
brought a § 1983 action pro se in October 2000.126 There were two
claims in the action (on appeal),'27 both under the Eighth Amendment
of the Constitution128 for cruel and unusual punishment. 129 His first
claim asserted that the defendants were required, and failed, to
maintain a safe shower facility. 130  Ross's second claim alleged
deliberate indifference to his medical needs by failing to provide
adequate treatment for his shoulder injury.' The Tenth Circuit,
affirming the district court's dismissal .of the case, 32 concluded that
Ross exhausted his claim as to the dangerous conditions of the shower
facility,'33 but failed to exhaust his deliberate medical indifference
121. Id. The general purpose of these forms is to give the inmate an avenue to ask
a question about a certain policy or express a concern or problem regarding a specific
incident, thereby diminishing the need for a formal legal challenge. See, e.g., Div. of
the Sheriff, Glenn County, The Glenn County Jail Handbook at sec. II, available at
http://www.countyofglenn.net/Jail/Section-Il.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). Terms
such as "Inmate Grievance Form" describe inmate grievance procedures that are
typical to all prisons, though they are given different names in different facilities.
122. Ross, 365 F.3d at 1182-83. This grievance was partly about a housing transfer,
which was deemed a "non-grievable issue." Id. at 1183. Also on December 1, 1999
Ross had filed a Sick Call Request, seeking medical attention for his injured shoulder.
Id. at 1182.
123. In addition to the December 1 Sick Call Request, Ross filed more Sick Call
Requests or Inmate Medical Request Forms on December 6, December 9, December
14, December 23, February 21, 2000, March 2, April 17, May 10, May 28, June 12, and




127. See id. at 1183 n.3.
128. The Eighth Amendment reads in full: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. (applied through the Fourteenth Amendment).
129. Ross, 365 F.3d at 1183.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1183-84. Though the district court applied the total exhaustion rule in
the same manner as the circuit court, its decision was affirmed for different reasons.
Id. In construing the evidence, the district court believed Ross had exhausted his
administrative remedies as to the deliberate medical indifference claim but failed to
exhaust with respect to his dangerous conditions of confinement claim. Id. at 1183.
133. Id. at 1184. The court first found that Ross did not procedurally default on his
dangerous conditions of confinement claim because he filed his Pre-Grievance
Request Form "before the allegedly dangerous condition had been made safer." Id. at
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claim.' In conformance with the total exhaustion doctrine, Ross's
complaint was dismissed in its entirety without prejudice. 13 5
2. Ortiz v. McBride'36
On September 29, 1998, Jose Ortiz, while incarcerated in Arthur
Kill Correctional Facility,137 was confronted and accused by defendant
Sergeant Dennis McBride of smuggling drugs into the prison and
selling them therein.1 38 On October 2, McBride brought these charges
in a disciplinary hearing. 139 Based on very limited evidence,140
defendant Robert O'Mara found Ortiz to be in violation of
Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") rules, sentencing him
to ninety days in solitary confinement.14' Following the decision, Ortiz
appealed pursuant to DOCS' procedural requirements.14
1186; see supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. As such, upon receiving a
favorable outcome to the first step of the process, Ross did not need to move on to
the second step. Id. at 1186-87. To force him to do so would be to "engage in entirely
fruitless exercises when no form of relief is available at all." Id. at 1187 (citing and
distinguishing the Supreme Court's holding in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001)).
134. Id. at 1184. The court referred to Ross's "laundry list" of medical treatment
issues, indicating that he was seeking relief for more than just his shoulder injury. Id.
at 1188. Because none of these post-December 1 incidents were dealt with through
the grievance process, prison officials were not put on proper notice of Ross's
problems. Id. Accordingly, Ross should not have had access to federal courts. Id.
135. Id. at 1190.
136. 380 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2005)
(No. 04-668). The court of appeals repeated the facts as set forth in the prior opinion
in this case, which was decided in March 2003. Id. at 651. There, the Second Circuit
held that Ortiz sufficiently raised the issue of whether administrative exhaustion of
remedies was completed due to a lack of response by prison officials and defendant
McBride's threat of assault for instituting an action. Ortiz v. McBride, 323 F.3d 191,
194-95 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 2004)
("A prisoner who has not received promised relief is not required to file a new
grievance where doing so may result in a never-ending cycle of exhaustion.");
Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 696-98 (2d Cir. 2004) (remanding to the district
court to determine whether "the allegedly confusing nature of N.Y. [Department of
Correctional Services] regulations justified the plaintiff's failure to file a grievance");
Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686-88 (2d Cir. 2004) (same); Giano v. Goord,
380 F.3d 670, 675-80 (2d Cir. 2004) (same). Total exhaustion was held as an open
issue before the Second Circuit pending Ortiz's appointment of counsel. Ortiz, 323
F.3d at 196. In the following case, Ortiz was, in fact, represented by counsel. Ortiz,
380 F.3d at 650.
137. Arthur Kill is operated by the New York State Department of Correctional
Services ("DOCS"). Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 651. See N.Y. State Dept. of Correctional
Servs., Facility Listing, at http://www.docs.state.ny.us/faclist.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2005) (providing a listing and brief description of DOCS' New York prisons).
138. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 651.
139. Id.
140. Id. McBride instituted these proceedings despite the fact that Ortiz had
passed four urine tests (showing that he was, at least, not using the drugs), and that
the information McBride was acting on was based entirely on a confidential
informant. Id.
141. Id. Along with this sentence came a loss of rights to "packages, commissary,
phone, and recreational privileges .. " Id. Euphemistically known as a "special
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During the first three weeks of his confinement, Ortiz contended
that he was kept in his cell for twenty-four hours a day.
143
Consequently, he was unable to shower for weeks, was denied
deodoran and toothpaste, was served meals later than other inmates,
and was not given utensils for his meals, leaving him to eat with the
fingers he could not wash.1" Ortiz also alleged that corrections
officers threatened to beat him and charge him with additional
violations when he complained to them about the confinement
conditions.'45 After fifty-seven days of confinement at Arthur Kill,
Ortiz was transferred to Fishkill Correctional Facility, 46 where he
complained of being forced to share a cell with one toilet with another
inmate who was an apparent threat to Ortiz.147 On December 28,
1998, the very last day of Ortiz's confinement, his disciplinary ruling
was reversed.
148
Based on the disciplinary hearing that led to his SHU sentence and
the conditions of that confinement, Ortiz brought a § 1983 action in
July 1999.149 His first claim was under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause,15° alleging that the disciplinary hearing deprived
him of his liberty interest.' Next, Ortiz claimed that the conditions
of his confinement rose to the level of cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 52 Though Ortiz conceded that
his Eighth Amendment claim was not viable,153 all parties agree that
he exhausted his administrative remedies as to his Fourteenth
Amendment claim. 5 4  Rejecting the total exhaustion doctrine, the
housing unit" or "SHU," this type of confinement, as evidenced in Ortiz, has
produced a slew of § 1983 litigation. See, e.g., id. at 651-52; Trammell v. Keane, 338
F.3d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 2003); Ghana v. Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
142. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 651.
143. Id.
144. Id. These allegations came in Ortiz's First Amended Complaint, which further
stated that his clothes were deliberately drenched with baby oil. Id.
145. Id. at 651-52.
146. Id. at 652. This facility is also operated by DOCS. See supra note 137.
147. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 652.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. The applicable part of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
151. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 652.
152. Id. (applied through the Fourteenth Amendment).
153. Id. at 653. Ortiz merely complained orally about his conditions of
confinement. Although these oral complaints purportedly led to officer threats of
physical violence, it is not necessarily the case that Ortiz's administrative remedies
were rendered "unavailable" under § 1997e(a). Id. at 654 (citing Hemphill v. New
York, 380 F.3d 680, 689-91 (2d Cir. 2004)).
154. Id. at 653-54. Ortiz's appeal of the disciplinary hearing yielded a reversal, and
no further procedure was necessary to pursue. Id; see Ross v. County of Bernalillo,
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court held that, on remand, the district court should dismiss the
unexhausted claims and decide the exhausted claims.
155
B. Textual Analysis
The Supreme Court has declared that "[wihen construing statutes,
we look to the statutory language, which, if clear on its face, ends our
analysis." '56  The circuits' textual arguments were brief because §
1997e(a) and its underlying legislative history 157 evade such clear
meaning, giving very few palpable clues regarding total exhaustion.
By its terms, once again, the PLRA provides that "[n]o action shall be
brought" prior to exhaustion of administrative remedies. 158 In Graves
v. Norris, the court concluded that a mixed action must be dismissed
in its entirety, not merely the unexhausted claims, because "the plain
language of § 1997e(a) requires" as much.1 59 An essential question to
be answered, therefore, is whether the plain language of § 1997e(a)
makes any demands as to total exhaustion.
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits decidedly believed that it did,
evidenced by Congress's use of the word "action" instead of
"claim."' ' The Second Circuit, on the other hand, did not think the
statute was clear on its face.' 6 ' In Ortiz, the court chose to focus on
the term "brought" in § 1997e(a).'62 Though Ortiz's action clearly
should not have been brought, it did follow "that the only possible
response to the impermissibility of the bringing of the action is to
dismiss it in its entirety-to kill it rather than to cure it."' 63  The
Second Circuit, like the Tenth Circuit, used § 1997e(c) to augment its
argument, but obviously in a different way. 6" That provision, entitled
"Dismissal," makes no mention of mixed actions. 65 Therefore,
according to the Second Circuit, § 1997e(a) is facially ambiguous, and
it is more likely that Congress never considered mixed actions while
drafting the PLRA.166
365 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 2004). The defendants also called for dismissal under §
1997e(c)(2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ortiz, 380
F.3d at 652. The court, however, held that Ortiz satisfied the two requisites for a due
process claim; he had a liberty interest and the defendants deprived him of that
interest. Id. at 654-55.
155. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 663.
156. Id. at 656 (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999)).
157. See supra Part I.B.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
159. Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 885 (8th Cir. 2000).
160. Id.; Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1190 (10th Cir. 2004).
161. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 656-57.
162. Id. at 657.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Id. (stating that § 1997e(c) is "the place where we would expect to find
guidance as to whether dismissal of 'mixed' actions is required").
166. Id. at 657-58.
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C. The Applicability of Habeas "Total Exhaustion" to Prisoner Civil
Rights Cases
To support its policy arguments,167 the Tenth Circuit primarily
relied on the total exhaustion rule under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,168 which
was established in the landmark Supreme Court case of Rose v.
Lundy. 169 There, the Court ruled that the district court must dismiss
"mixed petitions" in their entirety, as this would further the purposes
of the habeas statute. 7 Like § 1997e, the language of § 2254 does not
directly address mixed actions.171 Thus, stressing the doctrine of
comity, 172 the Court considered the policies underlying the statute. 173
The court in Ross provided a succinct overview of the Rose
decision. 174  First, total exhaustion in the habeas context would
promote a policy whereby prisoners would go first to state courts to
seek relief.175 This would give those courts the first chance to review
167. See infra Part II.D.
168. Section (b)(1) reads:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it
appears that-(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective
process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the applicant.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2000).
169. 455 U.S. 509 (1982). Lundy, convicted and sentenced for rape and crime
against nature, filed a petition for habeas corpus, in which he failed to exhaust his
state remedies for three of the four alleged grounds for relief. Id. at 511.
Nevertheless, after assessing the overall "atmosphere" of the trial, the district court
found that Lundy's right to a fair trial was violated. Id. at 511-12. This decision was
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, rejecting the argument that the petition should have
been dismissed because it was "mixed." Id. at 513.
170. Id. at 510. But cf West v. Kolar, 108 Fed. Appx. 568, 570 (10th Cir. 2004) ("It
also follows from the adaptation of the rule in Rose v. Lundy that the district court
may permit an inmate who has filed a mixed complaint in a § 1983 complaint to
dismiss voluntarily his unexhausted claims and to proceed only on those he has
exhausted."). Similarly, a prisoner may file a motion to amend his mixed complaint to
contain only the exhausted claim. See Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144
(8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that, despite a failure to exhaust one of the
claims in his action, the district court's denial of Kozohorsky's motion to amend his
complaint was an abuse of discretion).
171. Rose, 455 U.S. at 516-17 ("Because the legislative history of § 2254 ...
contains no reference to the problem of mixed petitions, in all likelihood Congress
never thought of the problem.").
172. Id. at 518. Comity "teaches that one court should defer action on causes
properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent
powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon
the matter." Id. (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)).
173. See id. at 518-22.
174. Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2004).
175. Id. at 1189 (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 518-19).
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claims of error.176 Second, a total exhaustion rule would facilitate a
more complete factual record to assist federal courts in their review.
177
Lastly, such a rule would relieve district courts from having to decide
when claims are related, and therefore, severable from one another.
78
In sum, by allowing district courts to review all claims in one
proceeding, total exhaustion would "promote judicial efficiency by
discouraging piecemeal litigation ....
Though exhaustion in the habeas context is seemingly analogous to
exhaustion under the PLRA, s0 the Second Circuit was far more
hesitant to accept the analogy. 8' The court believed that the habeas
analogy was misplaced primarily because the habeas exhaustion
requirement derives from fundamental principles of sovereignty.
8 2
Whereas federal courts apply the doctrine of comity to habeas cases,
183
prisoner § 1983 actions have no constitutionally based equivalent."
The dissimilar foundations for these actions have two procedural
corollaries. First, in the prison administrative proceedings typical to
prisoner civil rights claims, the prison official need not adhere to rules
of evidence or other standards characteristic of courts of law (which
are deferred to in habeas proceedings).185 As such, prison proceedings
are much less likely to facilitate a complete factual record for the
federal court.'86 Second, by allowing the exhausted portions of a
mixed complaint to proceed, prisoners are not dissuaded from making
full use of the administrative procedures available to them. 87 Rather,
prisoners will still understand that to gain access to the federal court
system, they must exhaust their claim.' 88
Another difference between habeas applications and § 1983 suits
that illustrates the inapplicability of the analogy is the type of
grievance usually present in each claim. 189 While habeas applications
176. Id. (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 518-19). Consequently, state courts "may become
increasingly familiar with and hospitable toward federal constitutional issues." Rose,
455 U.S. at 519.
177. Ross, 365 F.3d at 1189 (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 519).
178. Id. (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 518-19).
179. Id. at 1190 (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 520).
180. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
181. See Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 660-62 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73
U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2005) (No. 04-668).
182. Id. at 660.
183. See supra note 172.
184. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 660 (claiming that there is no comity issue in prisoner civil
rights actions because prison grievance systems, unlike state courts, limit their review
to violations of prison policy).
185. Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)) ("Prison disciplinary
proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a
defendant in such proceedings does not apply.").
186. Id. at 661. Compare with supra text accompanying note 177.
187. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 661.
188. Id. Compare with supra text accompanying notes 175-76.
189. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 661.
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predominantly concern one grievance-a conviction in state court' 9° -
prisoners' § 1983 actions often seek redress for many grievances
related to various events.1 91 Section 1983 claims are less likely to be
interrelated and therefore would be easily discernable to the district
courts. 192  Moreover, in § 1983 suits, there is less complexity in
determining whether the exhausted claims are severable from the
unexhausted claims.
193
The Second Circuit makes one additional distinction between
habeas corpus and civil rights suits. If a habeas application is
dismissed for failure to exhaust, the application can be exhausted in
the state courts and subsequently brought into a federal habeas
proceeding.194 Prison grievance procedures, however, generally have
short time limits, 195 rendering it unlikely that an unexhausted § 1983
claim will eventually be exhausted and reasserted into a federal court
case. 196 Therefore, piecemeal litigation is far less of a concern in §
1983 claims, as resolving all of the claims together is not generally
necessary. 197
D. Improving the Quality of Prisoner Suits
In its most recent decision about the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement, the Supreme Court illuminated the purpose of the
provision: "[T]o reduce the quantity and improve the quality of
prisoner suits."' 98  Both the Second and Tenth Circuits deem their
approach to the total exhaustion issue to be in line with the Supreme
Court's statement. 199
190. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510-11 (1982) (noting that Lundy's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus only concerned the jury trial in which he was
found guilty of rape and crime against nature).
191. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 661.
192. See, e.g., Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 693-94 (2d Cir. 2004). In his
action, Johnson brought one claim after receiving serious injuries and a SHU sentence
for an extremely violent altercation with an inmate, allegedly caused by the
provocation of a corrections officer. Id. Johnson's second claim was that in an
unrelated incident, another corrections officer handcuffed him behind his back and
left the cuffs on for seven hours, causing severe shoulder and back pain. Id.
193. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 661. Compare with supra text accompanying note 178.
194. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 661 (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 520).
195. See, e.g., Div. of the Sheriff, Glenn County, supra note 121 ("The grievant has
five working days after the occurrence of any specific incident in which to file a
grievance.").
196. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 662 ("[U]nexhausted prisoners' 1983 claims, once dismissed,
are unlikely ever to be revived in district court. And even if they are, they may well
be about facts unrelated to those underlying the claims of which the court has already
disposed.").
197. Id.
198. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). The Court later added that "the
PLRA's dominant concern [is] to promote administrative redress, filter out
groundless claims, and foster better prepared litigation of claims aired in court" Id. at
528.
199. See Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 658 (claiming that a rule requiring district courts to
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The Tenth Circuit's view is simply an outgrowth of the habeas
analogy to total exhaustion.2°1 In the civil rights context, total
exhaustion would encourage prisoners to make full use of their
prison's grievance process,2 1 which would in turn create an
administrative record that would assist federal courts if the claim was
not first resolved by prison officials.2' The Tenth Circuit also
accepted, by way of habeas analogy, that district courts would not
have "to determine whether certain exhausted claims are severable
from other unexhausted claims that they are required to dismiss 23
and that "at least some piecemeal litigation" would be avoided.2°
The Second Circuit provides three reasons why a rule of total
exhaustion would not improve the quality of prisoners' § 1983 suits. 205
First, total exhaustion could potentially create an incentive to file
multiple § 1983 suits if they have multiple claims.2°  Second,
dismissing the entire action would do little more than cause prisoners
with mixed actions to refile their exhausted claim with the
unexhausted claim omitted.2 7 Consequently, courts would have to
resolve the same claim they confronted at the beginning of the
proceedings. 20 8 Third, deciding whether a claim is exhausted is not a
straightforward issue, but often requires familiarization with the case
in order to make a determination.2 9 Moreover, it does not "aid
efficiency to require that, if the court decides the claim-exhaustion
dismiss mixed actions would not be in the best interests of improving the quality of
prisoner suits); Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1190 (10th Cir. 2004)
(arguing that the PLRA's underlying policies point toward a total exhaustion
requirement).
200. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
201. Ross, 365 F.3d at 1190 (citing Porter, 534 U.S. at 524-25; Rose v. Lundy, 455




205. See Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 658-59 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73
U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2005) (No. 04-668).
206. Id. at 658. The court acknowledged that this rationale is somewhat weak,
considering that splitting claims can "be mitigated by other factors, such as a desire to
avoid paying multiple filing fees or risking incurring three 'strikes."' Id. at 658 n.7.
With their income only a fraction of the filing fee, prisoners are strongly deterred
from filing claims in federal court. See John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform
Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 429, 430 (2001). Also,
prisoners with three or more prior dismissals of an action or appeal dismissed on the
grounds that it was "frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted" may not proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000). For
a discussion of this provision, see Joshua D. Franklin, Comment, Three Strikes and
You're Out of Constitutional Rights? The Prison Litigation Reform Act's "Three
Strikes" Provision and Its Effect on Indigents, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 191 (2000).
207. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 658. Based on the short time periods associated with prison
grievance procedures, "prisoners are likely to simply amend their complaints to
eliminate the unexhausted claims and refile." Id. at 659 (internal citation omitted).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 659; see, e.g., supra note 136.
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issue against the prisoner, it must then dismiss any remaining
exhausted claims only to allow the same case, absent the unexhausted
claims, to be reinstituted, heard again on the exhausted issues, and
then decided. 210
As shown, the Second and Tenth Circuits have starkly different
views of how § 1997e(a) should be interpreted in order to promote
judicial efficiency in prisoner litigation. Based on the underlying
purposes of the PLRA, the Second Circuit's decision to allow mixed
complaints to go forward is sounder than the Tenth Circuit's
misapplication of the habeas analogy. Accordingly, Part III of this
Note advocates the Second Circuit approach, simultaneously allowing
a justifiable level of prisoner access to federal courts and preserving
the spirit of the PLRA.
III. "TOTAL EXHAUSTION": TAKING THE PLRA Too FAR
The Tenth Circuit's approach discussed in Part II would close the
door to prisoner lawsuits (both frivolous and meritorious) for purely
technical reasons. This part opposes a total exhaustion rule under the
PLRA and instead advocates the approach of the Second Circuit.
Part III.A contends that the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of §
1997e(a) is misapplied and excessive, in contrast to the Second
Circuit's more principled and policy-oriented approach. Part III.B
concludes that prisoners' claims cannot all simply be classified as
frivolous. The PLRA's exhaustion provision, therefore, adequately
achieves Congress's goal of curbing frivolous suits without a need for
total exhaustion.
A. The Ineffectiveness of a "Total Exhaustion" Rule in the Civil Rights
Context
A total exhaustion rule is not mandated by the text of § 1997e(a),
nor do the Tenth Circuit's policy arguments demonstrate the need for
such an interpretation of the statute.
1. Textual Ambiguity
The Second and Tenth Circuits disagree as to two aspects of §
1997e(a)'s language. The first issue is whether use of the term
"action" instead of "claim" indicates that Congress intended a total
exhaustion rule. While it is true that Congress used the term
"action,, 211 there is negligible evidence showing that Congress meant
that language to imply total exhaustion.1 2 Because of the very sparse
210. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 659 (noting this to be especially true when the court must
hear the same factual background of claims that are factually interrelated).
211. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
212. See Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 658 ("[T]he parties have not identified, and we are not
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legislative record on exhaustion,213 the Tenth Circuit had to rely
primarily on the habeas analogy to support a total exhaustion rule,2
4
rather than the unclear text of the PLRA.21 5 Thus, it would be a
stretch to say that the language of § 1997e(a) signifies any
congressional intent on the total exhaustion issue.
The second issue, that is really ancillary to the first, is whether §
1997e(c), addressing dismissal of suits by prisoners, strengthens or
weakens the argument that Congress deliberately used the word
"action" in § 1997e(a).216 It is possible that, as compared to §
1997e(c), use of the word "action" in § 1997e(a) was premeditated by
a Congress that desired "action-dismissal" as opposed to "claim-
dismissal. 21 7 As explained by the Second Circuit in a past decision,
"[w]e presume that the use of different terminology within a body of
legislation evidences a Congressional purpose to differentiate.
218
There are two problems with this argument in the context of the
PLRA. First, § 1997e(a) addresses a largely different issue than §
1997e(c)(2). In the former, exhaustion is required for a prisoner to
proceed to federal court. In the latter, a court may dismiss a frivolous
claim without requiring exhaustion. Thus, no Congressional intent
can be discerned from the use of different terms in these dissimilar
sections. Second, Congress could have easily chosen to add language
to § 1997e(a) explaining how courts should handle mixed actions.
Congress could also have added language to § 1997e(c)(1) requiring
the dismissal of mixed actions. 219 Therefore, § 1997e(c) gives no real
clues about how to construe § 1997e(a)'s language.
In comparing total exhaustion in the habeas context and the PLRA
context, the Tenth Circuit was correct to quote Rose on one point:
"In all likelihood Congress never thought of the problem., 220 As such,
otherwise aware of, any legislative history suggesting that Congress directly
considered [total exhaustion] or had any particular intent with respect to whether
'mixed' actions should be dismissed in their entirety."); supra notes 71-85 and
accompanying text.
213. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 158-60, 164-65 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
218. United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 1987). But see Pub. Lands
Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 746-47 (2000) ("Nor does the statute's basic purpose
require that the two sets of different words mean the same thing.").
219. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. For example, Congress could have
required dismissal under § 1997e(c)(1) for an action that is "frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.... [and] seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief," 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (2000), or has
one or more claims that are unexhausted.
220. Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 517 (1982)). After raising this point, the court went on
to emphasize the Supreme Court's policy rationale in Rose. Id. at 1189-90.
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allowing exhausted claims in mixed actions to be heard in court would
not go against Congress's intentions.
2. No Policy Justification
Though Congress did not consider total exhaustion when drafting
the PLRA, it remains plausible that the policies underlying the statute
lend support to the application of the doctrine. On the surface, a total
exhaustion rule seemingly conforms to the Supreme Court's statement
of the PLRA's purposes.221  The Tenth Circuit sets forth three
problems that stem from allowing mixed complaints to proceed. First,
there would be no factual record to aid the federal courts.222 Second,
district courts would have to decide what claims are severable.223
Third, there would be more piecemeal litigation.224  This Note,
consistent with the view of the Second Circuit, refutes this superficial
rationale as both misapplied and specious, needlessly denying prisoner
access to the court system.
The Tenth Circuit's rationale is misapplied because of its reliance
on the total exhaustion rule in the habeas context. Although the
Supreme Court stated the advantages of habeas total exhaustion in
Rose, 25 it does not necessarily follow that the same advantages exist
under § 1983 prisoner claims. As enunciated by the Second Circuit,
there are three fundamental differences between the claims that
render the analogy invalid. First, the lower proceeding in a civil rights
claim is an administrative hearing rather than a state court
proceeding. 226 Thus, it is unlikely that a complete factual record will
be accumulated. 227 As opposed to prisoners filing habeas petitions,
allowing mixed complaints to proceed will have no cognizable effect
on prisoner use of the grievance procedure.228 Under the PLRA,
prison officials will still have the first opportunity to resolve a
complaint and potentially resolve frivolous claims before they reach
federal court.2 9 Next, there is a fundamental difference between what
221. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
223. See supra text accompanying note 203.
224. See supra text accompanying note 204.
225. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
229. For example, allowing one of Pat Prisoner's claims in his mixed complaint to
go forward will not discourage him from making full use of the grievance procedures
for other claims. Conversely, he will see that prison officials must be given the first
chance to rectify the problem and still must go through the same process for
additional claims if he wants those to be heard in federal court. Moreover, a total
exhaustion requirement would have no stronger impact on "encourag[ing] prisoners
to make full use of inmate grievance procedures." Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365
F.3d 1181, 1190 (10th Cir. 2004). As such, allowing mixed complaints to proceed is as
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a prisoner is seeking in a habeas petition and a § 1983 complaint. 230
Finally, due to short time limits for prison grievance procedures, the
future exhaustibility of a dismissed habeas petition is far less
questionable than that of a § 1983 complaint.231
The Tenth Circuit's rationale is specious, even if the habeas analogy
was deemed valid. Having already dismissed the contention that a
total exhaustion rule would encourage use of the grievance process
and facilitate an administrative record,2 32 two unsound assertions
remain: complications regarding severability and piecemeal litigation.
Regarding severability, a district court does not really have to decide
what claims are severable. The notion of severability is inapposite to
civil litigation, where joinder of claims is permissive rather than
compulsory. 233  Therefore, a court would simply dismiss any
unexhausted claims and proceed with whatever is left.2' Regarding
piecemeal litigation, it is highly unlikely that allowing mixed
complaints to proceed will have this result. Dismissing an entire
action based on failure to exhaust one claim would only cause a
prisoner to refile that action minus the unexhausted claim. 235 As the
Second Circuit noted, the likelihood that an unexhausted claim would
appear again is miniscule, given the short filing deadlines for
grievances. 236 Consequently, under a total exhaustion regime, when
the prisoner refiles, the court will inefficiently hear the same claim it
heard in the initial proceeding.237 In the unlikely scenario where
claims are so interrelated that they have to be tried together, a judge
likely as total exhaustion to produce an administrative record and filter out frivolous
claims.
230. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text. For example, as opposed to
filing a petition for a criminal conviction, Pat Prisoner asserted that the type of pillow
he had was inadequate (Eighth Amendment violation) and that Gus Guard harmed
him after he complained (Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations). The
outcome of the trial of the first issue has no necessary implication for the outcome of
the second issue.
231. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 226-28; note 229 and accompanying text.
233. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18-21.
234. So long as it conforms with the provisions of § 1997e(c).
235. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. Statutes of limitations are a
further impediment to the possibility of piecemeal litigation. If a court dismisses the
mixed complaint after the statute of limitations has run, the prisoner would not be
able to refile at all. The tolling of the statute of limitations is not an improbable
occurrence because prisoner suits must be processed by the pro se office and then go
through standard civil litigation, which could potentially be quite lengthy. See, e.g.,
Benjamin Weiser, Judge's Decisions Draw Notice, for Being Conspicuously Late, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 6, 2004, at Al.
236. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
237. See supra text accompanying note 208. For example, if Pat Prisoner's
complaint is dismissed pursuant to the total exhaustion rule, he will probably refile a
complaint only alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for being forced to sleep on
firm pillows, a claim the court familiarized itself with in the previous proceeding. See
supra text accompanying notes 209-10.
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could choose to direct the prisoner to notify the court as to whether he
will attempt to exhaust the claim and bring it back to court. If the
prisoner so attempts, the judge can delay the trial for a short time to
permit that to happen. Implying that there is room for such
discretion, the Second Circuit noted that "in the ordinary case, once
the district court dismisses the unexhausted claims, it will proceed
directly to decide the exhausted claims without waiting for the
plaintiff to attempt to exhaust available administrative remedies with
respect to the dismissed claims." '238
The total exhaustion doctrine does nothing to add to the
effectiveness of § 1997e(a), and sometimes even goes against the
intentions of the PLRA by impairing judicial efficiency. Once a
prisoner files an exhausted claim (and complies with other statutory
provisions), there is no justifiable reason to deny access to federal
courts.
B. The Need for a Softer Interpretation of § 1997e(a)
Undoubtedly, one of Congress's primary goals in enacting the
PLRA was to curb frivolous suits.23 9 The categorization of inmate
litigation as frivolous, however, has led to significant limitations on
both meritorious and trivial claims alike. n  Although prisoner
lawsuits, in the aggregate, are crowding the federal docket241 and are
not always legitimate,2 42 these points are neither straightforward nor
absolute. Prisoner lawsuits crowd the federal docket because of a
booming prison population in America.2 43 And while there will
recurrently be frivolous lawsuits, there are also countless inmate
claims which present serious wrongs in need of remedy.244 Professor
Kermit Roosevelt captured the nature of the situation in writing:
Let us be candid. There is no denying that frivolous suits make up a
large number-and even a fairly large percentage-of the claims
brought by inmates under § 1983. But there are also real abuses that
take place within the prison system. Prisoners have, among other
things, been raped, shot, and beaten to death by guards.245
There is no need to look any further than the facts of the cases
involved in the circuit split to illustrate this point.246 In Ross, the
238. Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 663 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W.
3513 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2005) (No. 04-668).
239. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 65.
241. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 651-52 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73
U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2005) (No. 04-668); Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365
F.3d 1181, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2004).
245. Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1776.
246. See supra Part II.A.
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prisoner claimed to have seriously injured his shoulder due to the
inadequacy of the prison's shower facility. 247 Even more egregious, in
Ortiz, the prisoner alleged that he was wrongly placed in solitary
confinement, and while serving his time, was denied some of the most
basic life necessities.248
These cases are characteristic of many prisoner claims that continue
to be largely ignored by an unsympathetic society. The 104th
Congress also overlooked these claims 249 because they were not
sensational enough to make it onto the notorious "top ten" lists. 250
Instead, conservatives were able to enact the PLRA by focusing on
peanut butter 25 1 and the like, cases which were often far less trivial
than they appeared on their face. 2  Finally, by applying the habeas
"procedural default" to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, federal
district courts are exacerbating prisoners' (mostly proceeding pro
se) 253 problems by barring subsequent § 1983 actions on technical
grounds.254 The cumulative effect has been to curb the amount of
total prisoner lawsuits, both frivolous and meritorious.255
In no way should this suggest that the PLRA was unwarranted
legislation on the whole. Rather, it implies that unaccommodating
interpretations of the PLRA's provisions go against the purpose of the
statute to curb frivolous lawsuits and improve judicial efficiency.256
While none of the proponents of the PLRA sought to deter
meritorious prisoner lawsuits25 (at least openly),258 there is no
question that all prisoners have felt the impact of the Act.259 With the
efficacy of the PLRA's requirements, an extremely strict reading of §
1997e(a), 26 requiring total exhaustion, adds little to Congress's
established success in implementing the statute.261 To the contrary, a
247. Ross, 365 F.3d at 1182.
248. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 651-52.
249. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
252. See Newman, supra note 50, at 6.
253. See supra note 36.
254. See supra notes 96-98, 102 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S14572 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("[Wie will
free up judicial resources for claims with merit by both prisoners and nonprisoners.").
258. See Branham, supra note 35, at 506 ("[Nlone of those few members of
Congress who discussed the PLRA's exhaustion requirement admitted-and Senator
Hatch, who was a chief sponsor of the [PLRA], specifically denied-enacting the
requirement in order to discourage inmates, through the encumbrances of exhaustion,
from bringing even meritorious claims to court.").
259. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. If the intentions of Congress
are deemed to limit prisoner civil rights suits altogether, and the Tenth Circuit carries
out this goal by requiring total exhaustion, such an interpretation might not pass
muster under the Equal Protection Clause. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
260. See supra notes 159-60, 200-04 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
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looser interpretation is needed in order to simultaneously deter
frivolous claims and give the meritorious claims access to federal
court-accommodating both courts and prisoners. 62
CONCLUSION
Requiring total exhaustion under § 1997e(a) not only undermines
prisoners' rights, but does nothing to improve the functioning of the
federal court system-the underlying goal of the PLRA. As this Note
demonstrates, allowing mixed complaints to go forward will benefit
aggrieved prisoners without sacrificing judicial efficiency. Justice
Breyer recently presented a model of statutory interpretation that
eschewed relying solely on text or precedent and instead advocated
interpretations that would meet community needs and champion
individual rights.263 The result would be to "avoid the more rigid
interpretations [and to help] harmonize a court's daily work of
interpreting statutes with the Constitution's democratic and liberty-
protecting objectives. ' '26' Extending this reasoning to § 1997e(a), the
door to the federal courts should not be closed to prisoners if they
wish to proceed with a viable, fully exhausted claim.
262. See supra notes 161-66, 205-10 and accompanying text.
263. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 245, 260
(2002).
264. Id. at 268. For a recent example of Justice Breyer employing this philosophy
to the federal sentencing guidelines, see United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756-69
(2005).
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